15 May 2018

Modern science's theological hubris

 Modern science is very proud of itself, overweeningly so, for all it has effected and effects in the world. It has differentiated itself into countless areas of knowledge in both the natural and social sciences. The specialization into different kinds of knowing is so ramified, that not even those scientists working in the same science know about what their colleagues are doing in the very next compartment. To say nothing of whether, say, an economist knows anything about biology or vice versa. 

Regardless of the narrowing of the mind that accompanies scientific specialization, science is very proud for all the progress it continues to make, for its mission will never be finally accomplished. What is this mission? It is to establish foreknowing, effective mastery over all types of movement and change in the world, no matter of what kind including, of course, through medical science, the inevitable movement of mortal human life toward death. This scientific way of knowing has established itself as purportedly the sole mode of knowing access to the world that can be taken at all seriously. Everything else — such as literature, the arts, religion, the humanities — is merely cultural decoration which, of course, many scientists enjoy on the side. Science, however, is concerned with establishing the truth of the world through its empirically-based scientific method which, it claims, is the sole kind of truth with any serious credibility. Hence, any scientific claim has to be backed by reference to empirical studies or replicable experiments. For this scientific mind-set, all else is merely unsubstantiated, drivelling waffle. 

The scientific mind-set is smugly confident that it has the knowledge-game sewn up. It purports to have the only game in town that no other area of intellectual endeavour can hope to match. The humanities, for instance, are conceded their appropriate playground for reflecting on the human condition, but they represent no danger whatsoever to scientific knowing's hegemony, based as it is on the ostensibly hard, indisputable evidence of experimentally registered facts.

But this story of science's putatively unchallengeable hegemony as the only mode of truth is too good to be true. Its Achilles' heel is the state of empirical facts which the scientific mind takes to be naked facts, i.e. the 'unvarnished' data collected, according to proper experimental design, which are fed into a scientific theoretical model to either confirm or falsify it. In truth, these naked facts are vested with an interpretation prior to their being taken as facts. All so-called naked facts are in fact hermeneutically enrobed. The name for this a priori interpretation of all phenomena in the world is the hermeneutic As, for every phenomenon that shows itself to the human mind is understood in some way or other (including even misunderstood) as such-and-such. 

The most elementary phenomenological example of such showing-as is the category of something. If you look, say, at your left index finger, you see it as something, don't you? If you look at your right foot, you also see it as something, even as something else, don't you? Finger and foot are both understood 'self-evidently' as something, although, if you inspect your finger or foot, you can find no trace of the category of something in them. There is no empirical-factual basis for the category of something. Nor is the category of something to be discovered as some kind of evolutionarily arisen, genetically steered neuronal trace in the brain that generates somehow or other a subjective category of something in each and every single consciousness. For science the category of something is causally inexplicable. Nevertheless, something itself is indubitably a category interposed between your mind and the thing itself enabling you to understand anything as something.

This apparently trivial observation is, in truth, crucial, for the interpretive access to the world from the ground up does not stop with the category of something. The hermeneutic as interposes itself between the mind and beings showing themselves in the difference between beings themselves and how they are understood as such-and-such in their being. In phenomenology, this is known as the ontological difference between beings and their being, i.e. their 'beingness'. Among other things, phenomenological ontology studies the beingness of beings as they show themselves in a given age to an historical hermeneutic cast of mind.

At the culmination of ancient Greek thinking, Aristotle worked out his ontology of movement, which had been a problem for philosophy since its inception with Parmenides. What is movement/change? How is it to be conceived as a mode of being? Aristotle's answer is that movement is to be conceived as the putting-to-work of a power to effect an end. The Greek word for power here is δύναμις, which can be translated also as force, potential or potency. A power at work is its energy, ἐνέργεια, which effects finally (τέλος) a finished product.

Now the punch-line: this Aristotelean ontology of effective, productive movement was adopted by modern science, starting with Newton et al., whilst tacitly dropping its hermeneutic nature as an ontology of effective movement. With this sleight of hand, modern scientific slipped in its way of knowing in terms of cause and effect as the now apparently unquestionable nature of all movement and change in the world, whether it be natural or social. All today's scientific knowing (ἐπιστήμη) is dedicated to this ontology of effective movement, without knowing its own ontological orientation. From the start, the social sciences sought to emulate the natural sciences' success and hence adopted unwittingly also its ontology of efficient-causal movement. The only hitch is whether all movement and change in the world really does show itself to a careful gaze at the phenomena themselves as effected. Modern science postulates dogmatically that it is unquestionably so, and it points to the empirical evidence and the apparent unparalleled success of its theoretical models.  Even the quirkiness of so-called quantum indeterminacy will not stand in its way (which, incidentally, itself results from modern mathematical physics' misinterpretation of the nature of movement itself; cf. Digital Cast of Being).

But science's so-called evidence base is a case of blatantly begging the question (petitio principii), for the very principle is never put into question. In this case, the principle, i.e. the beginning, is the foundational ontology of effective movement. Since all modern science, of whatever ilk, denies the ontological difference, it is unable to see that its effective-causal access to the world is itself an effect of its own tunnel vision. Unbeknownst to itself, it is not only ontological in nature, but also thoroughly theological. It is, in truth, onto-theological. 

But hang on, this must be nonsense, for doesn't modern science reject all talk of God and gods? Nonetheless, the hidden god of all modern science is the absolute will to effective power over all kinds of movement and change, which science devotedly worships absolutely, not tolerating any other god beside it, i.e. another kind of knowing based on an alternative ontology of movement and change whose aim is not effective mastery. Those scientists who faithfully dedicate their lives to worshipping their unknown god are amply rewarded with secure, well-paid careers and honours bestowed.

I call the alternative mode of movement and change that calls for thinking today interplay. Unlike productive, effective movement, interplay is played out among two, three or many sources of power, instead of the classical ontology of effective movement that has to proceed from a single source of power, i.e. force. In classical ontology, if there are two or more forces, they interact, and their interaction remains precalculable by simple mathematical vector addition. This continues to hold when forces are conceived as force-fields. Not so with the ontology of interplay, in which the various sources of power are in unfathomable, unpredictable interplay with one another. That is, interplay is ontologically fundamentally different from interaction.
Hopelessly caught as it is in its own theological hubris coupled with deep ontological naivety, the modern scientific mind refuses absolutely to deny its hidden god and countenance an alternative, namely, an ontology of interplay as a kind of movement sui generis. Such an ontology demands learning to see that the interplay among sources of power is applicable first and foremost to us human beings sharing the world with each other. The interplay is, in the first place, one of the mutual estimation and esteeming of powers residing in the plurality of individual players. The individual players can no longer be understood as a kind of whats, e.g. hermeneutically cast as conscious subjects, but must be conceived as whos playing in the estimative interplay and demanding an explicitly unfolded phenomenology of whoness.

Already Aristotle's ethics were lacking their proper foundation in an ontology of sociating, estimative interplay. Instead, his ontology of effective movement was implicitly at work also in his ethics, which resulted in their being conceived hermeneutically as normatively bridling, a negative enterprise and one posterior to effective, productive knowing. A positive ethics, however, consists in taking the phenomenality of mutually estimating interplay into view and explicitly working out the appropriate ontology of sociating interplay.

Needless to say, all ethics since Aristotle have also remained captive implicitly to the will to effective power, with the result that all ethics hitherto have concerned themselves exclusively with normatively bridling effective and social power as some kind of afterthought. Hence ethics' impotence due to its always coming too late. Our present state of mind pays dearly for wilful blindness to the hermeneutic As lodged in the ontological difference, for it prevents seeing modern science as the consummation of the onto-theology of effective power.

Further reading: Social Ontology and, for the absolute will to effective power personified playfully as Willy P., Land of Matta

01 May 2018

Thinking sociation

Τhere is a difference between thinking about society and thinking society. It is questionable whether the Western tradition in thinking has ever thought the phenomenon of society in itself, its sociation (Vergesellschaftung) through a kind (είδος) of movement sui generis with its own peculiar ontology, namely, a social, sociating ontology. A preposterous claim that can be comfortably dismissed out of hand from a securely superior, more knowledgeable position such as that of empirically-based social science? Or a challenge that we must first learn to even countenance the ontological question concerning sociation and thus to think society as such as a mode of being, and a somewhat presumptuous claim that political philosophy and social science per se do not think the very element in which their thinking moves?

What does it mean to think society as such? Hasn’t the tradition of Western philosophy already thought society as a sociation of human beings living together in communities? Don’t other species of animals and even plants also form societies or sociations? What is the specific nature of human society? What is sociation as a mode of being? In Aristotle’s Politics we read that “man is by nature a social animal”, a ζῷον πολιτικόν. The social or political animal congregates around the pole of the πόλις, living together in communities. This famous Aristotelean definition of humankind’s essence, of what it means to be a human being as a social being, is closely linked with that other essential definition of man as τὸ ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, the animal that has the λόγος, or language, through which it reasons. Accordingly, humankind would be sociated first and foremost by virtue of having the power of speech as a means of communication.

The sociation of human community in the first place would be linguistic in nature or essence through the practice of humans’ talking with one another. Human community would thus be founded fundamentally on language employed to communicate in a context of common, shared living-practices, with language itself having arisen evolutionarily as enhancing survival chances of the human species. These basic definitions of human society seem to be hardly controversial statements and would presumably be accepted by both political philosophy and social science as rudimentary, essential, definitional characteristics of social human being. However, their apparent self-evidence is itself problematic for any socio-ontological questioning that takes neither human being nor sociating human being for granted, but rather patiently interrogates their meaning as modes of being. The run-of-the-mill way of thinking human being as the human species (είδος, look) subsumed under the genus (γένος, descent) of animals so well-established in scientific anthropology is one example of how superficially Greek thinking has been adopted and put to use, without the least inkling remaining of the ontological depths of thinking in which such terms είδος and γένος were first employed. There are good reasons to regard modern scientific thinking as the residual left-overs of Greek ontology unwittingly adopted which has long since covertly established its as-yet-unchallenged hegemony.

Further reading: Social Ontology.

21 April 2018

Ontological difference overgrown by weeds

Together with its staunch, subservient ally, analytic philosophy, the modern sciences, both natural and social, have grown and flourished as noxious weeds that spread into every crevice, covering and swallowing the ontological difference that has been the distinctive hallmark of all genuine philosophy since its Greek beginnings: the difference between beings and their mode of being.

The steady, centuries-long degeneration of mind has already led to today's situation, in which even philosophers — not to mention natural and social scientists of all stripes as well as artists — no longer have a clue what the ontological difference means. In this sense of oblivion to the OD, philosophy, too, has also long since degenerated into positivism. Hence, for instance, the never-ending dance in analytic philosophy between so-called realism and idealism, the hermeneutic AS remaining all the while invisible to analytic consciousness.

The historical dementia of the mens — the unminding of the mind, Geist, νοῦς — started already with its degeneration into consciousness, i.e. the co-knowing of itself of the self-certain ego, on which all knowledge was to be unshakably based. This Cartesian hermeneutic casting opened the modern age.

The ontological difference is the crucible whence not just the whatness of whats, but the whoness of whos is cast, and thus how a world shapes up and presents itself to the mind in open historical time.

Instead of hermeneutically recasting, demented modern consciousness is rushing headlong into outsourcing itself to algorithms in which it is becoming inexorably ever more inextricably — but altogether willingly — entangled.

And the worst of it is that 'we' are painlessly blind to what is happening, and therefore defenceless.

Further reading: The Digital Cast of Being. Digital Whoness, Social Ontology.

26 February 2018

Learning to see the difference

In philosophy you don't learn
anything new.
But you do learn to see
everything anew.
Namely, you learn
to see the difference,
the ontological one.


In der Philosophie lernt man
nichts Neues.
Aber man lernt,
alles neu zu sehen.
Man lernt nämlich,
die Differenz
– die ontologische –
zu sehen,

17 February 2018

The idea of Universal Basic Income

The proposal of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) as a response to jobs 'running out' due to algorithmic automation and as a 'final solution' to poverty has become popular in some quarters.

But does the UBI not display the Usual Bovine Ignorance about the nature of freedom? The phenomenon of freedom can only be disclosed by a thinking that has not cut off its access to the ontological difference that has nurtured Western thinking from its Greek origins on. In particular, as a social ontology shows, the phenomenon of freedom includes the striving for each individual to find and adopt his or her self in a reflection from its world of existential possibilities. Through this self-reflection afforded by the esteem of others, the self gains its own self-esteem — its stand and standing as somewho in the world.

Not only would a Universal Basic Income not address the need and desire for self-esteem, but, like the idea of the welfare state as a whole, would only further undermine the self-esteem of those needing encouragement most of all. Siphoning the poor off into the pool of social losers with misplaced compassion. Whereas, given encouragement, there is no end to what people can do for each other, each within the limits of their own abilities, whatever they may be, hence deriving their self-esteem and self-standing.

UBI seems to be not such a good idea, after all. And that already due to the Usual Bovine Ignorance about the nature of ideas themselves. An idea, namely, is the 'look' a phenomenon presents of itself in the difference between being and beings. Our times pay dearly for the lack of a phenomenology of freedom — and hardly a glimmer on the horizon. Positivist thinking of all shades is consolidating from generation to generation; the ability to think philosophically from the ontological difference is silently, painlessly dying.

CC to CC.

Further reading: Social Ontology

27 December 2017

Electrifying messages

McLuhan's "electric age" raises the question as to how the medium of electricity affects the message. The electric age was a long time coming, starting, perhaps, with Mary Shelley's Frankenstein at the beginning of the 19th century, once the electrons started to flow as electric current, instead of just being stored up statically as a positive electric charge (i.e. lacking electrons with negative charge) in ἤλεκτρον (amber) by rubbing the amber that could be discharged with a mighty spark, about which the Greeks already knew, not to mention Zeus' lightning bolts. Then in the early-to-mid-19th century came Faraday's experimenting and Maxwell's field equations for electromagnetism that enabled the reciprocating dance between the flow of electrons and magnetic force-field to be mathematized in four neat equations. Along with that, on the technological side, the invention of the telegraph (literally: far-writing) for sending Morse-coded electron messages along wires to write in far-off places revolutionized communications. Here the speed of the medium had a huge effect on messaging; the world grew smaller through having electrons assuming the wings of Hermes. Even the swiftest horses could not compete.

Excitation of the electrons took off with the incandescent lamp, with electrons emitting pure bearers of light-energy (photons) on becoming mightily excited in a wire enclosed in glass along with an inert gas. Then, instead of sending little electron messages along wire, there came the invention of the radio, which wirelessly and concentrically sent out (trans-mitted) messages as electromagnetic signals that could be deciphered at the other end by a radio receiver. For such messaging, Claude Shannon later developed the necessary mathematics for technologically managing signal-loss through electromagnetic noise.
Radio transmission accelerated and contracted the world still further, tying a mass public into its messages in a way that exceeded the massifying of society already accomplished by newspapers, which themselves emerged as a powerful medium in the early 19th century. 

The electromagnetic medium has engendered a yet more massified, fake togetherness. Today, anonymous 'people' have long since become the ubiquitous, constantly addressed 'subject' of the mass-media age, whose massified opinions matter solely in anonymous, massified form, as in 'People think this...', or 'They do that...' or the ubiquitous fake 'we' of democracy, as in 'What are we to do about ...?' The ongoing discussion of fake news enabled by cyberworld platforms leaves entirely out of account the fakeness of the 'we' in 'our' democratic societies, which the media's talking heads are loath to even mention for fear of offending their mass audiences. Do I hear the word 'sycophancy'?

To come now to music: in the first half of the 20th century, along with inventors from the U.S. radio and electronics industry, Les Paul experimented with electrifying the guitar, succeeding finally in making the first solid body electric guitar in the 1940s. Magnetized pick-ups positioned beneath the guitar's strings picked up their vibrational motion, thus inducing an electric current that was passed from the guitar along a wire to the amplifier. Boom! Electric music was born, exciting electrons for the sake of the musical human ear. This culminated in the 1950s in rock music, a prancing & dancing with electrons in which the electronic phenomena themselves became musical. It was not merely a case of amplifying volume, but of sui generis electro-acoustic phenomena attuning our shared psyche. Such sounds include the feedback, overdrive, distortion, flanging, phasing, fuzzing and wah-wah-ing of the electric guitar that has been rapidly mastered by outstanding guitarists within just a few decades. The energy of electrons was harnessed for powerful acoustic experience in stadium concerts and also recorded on wax, shellac, vinyl and finally digitized in CD and mp3 recordings. The code signalling how the electrons were to dance could be reproduced easily million-fold in these latter media.  

Electrons came to be bearers of musical messages setting the times' moods into vibration, thus attuning us to the world in a way different from lute, cello, flute and harpsichord. If the stately classical music of courtly times had given way in Europe to the more dynamic movements of horses after the French Revolution (cf. e.g. Beethoven), in the 20th century the electronic media came to dominate the musical messaging, just as communication in general became electronically massified. The electronic medium itself gives us the message of electrification, culminating in today's digitization of the world in which not only our age's mind is quickly adapting to algorithmic entrapment, but also to which our age's psyche has rapidly become more and more musically attuned.

Further reading: Thinking of Music, The Digital Cast of Being, Rafael Capurro's 'Angeletics Notes'.